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INTRODUCTION
During the late nineteenth century, law in the United States
began to develop into a field worthy of study at the university.1
Rather than learning law in the law office, the traditional method
for entry into the legal field in the States,2 the prospective lawyer
could learn law within the institution of higher education. Indeed,
the university provided a means of converting law from a trade
into a profession.
* Associate Professor of Law, Barry University. B.A. (summa cum laude),
Communication and English, California State University, Stanislaus, 1999; J.D.,
University of the Pacific, 2002; M.A., Communication, University of Utah, 2003; Ph.D.,
Communication, University of Utah, 2005. The author is a member of the State Bar of
California. For insightful feedback on prior versions of this Article, the author thanks
David J. Vergobbi of the University of Utah, Lisa Flores of the University of Colorado
at Boulder, Wayne McCormack of the University of Utah, Tarla Rai Peterson of Texas
A&M University, and Richard D. Rieke of the University of Utah.
1 ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S
TO THE 1980S 36 (1983).
2 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 278 (1973). In England,
training for entry into the legal field also had been practical in nature. The Inns of
Court in London, which were separate from the universities like Oxford and
Cambridge, provided such training. Id. at 20.
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Earlier scholarship has explained how, between 1870 and
1920, some lawyers used rhetoric3 to construct a scholarly role, or
persona, appropriate for the law professor situated within the U.S.
university.4 This scholar persona had multiple dimensions that
included (1) an almost exclusive professional commitment, (2)
teaching duties, (3) the production of research, and (4) a public
function.5 The scholar persona contrasted sharply with the
practitioner persona of the law professor that other lawyers
advocated. The primary claims in support of the latter persona
were (1) that law was a practical subject that called for practical
training and (2) that only an individual with practical background
was well-suited for assuming the law professor persona.6
Rhetorical conflict between these competing views resulted.
By the early 1920s, law schools had established themselves
as the main portals of entry into the legal field in the United
States. Even a decade earlier, most of the individuals admitted to
the bar had gone to law school.7 Meanwhile, law office study “was
traveling the long dusty road to extinction.”8 “The American law
professor [was becoming] American legal education,”9 and the
scholar model of the law professor had been spreading to the
nation’s major universities at least since the dawn of the new
century.10 The legal field was undergoing a process of
professionalization.

3 The term rhetoric refers to communication, which itself refers to human symbol
use. SONJA K. FOSS & KAREN A. FOSS, INVITING TRANSFORMATION: PRESENTATIONAL
SPEAKING FOR A CHANGING WORLD 4 (2d ed. 2003). This Article focuses on rhetoric that
is persuasive in nature. See ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE
36 (George A. Kennedy trans., 1991).
4 See generally Carlo A. Pedrioli, Constructing Modern-Day U.S. Legal Education
with Rhetoric: Langdell, Ames, and the Scholar Model of the Law Professor Persona, 66
RUTGERS L.J. 55 (2014). For a discussion of legal education and the role of the law
professor in continental Europe, England, and the United States before 1870, see id. at
59-62.
5 Id. at 69-70.
6 Id. at 75.
7 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 35 (2002).
8 Id.
9 Douglas D. McFarland, Self-Images of Law Professors: Rethinking the Schism in
Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 232, 232 (1985).
10 BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION: C.C.
LANGDELL, 1826-1906 192 (2009).
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With the change in the means of entry into the legal field,
some observers, including U.S. Attorney General Harlan F. Stone,
later a member of the U.S. Supreme Court,11 were concerned that,
while law school was more the norm for prospective lawyers, not
all schools had high standards. This phenomenon was “the
development in the United States of two distinct types of law
school.”12 Stone suggested that one type of law school, the
university law school, had “high entrance requirements and
exacting educational standards,” while the other type, often the
night or part-time school, had “low admission requirements, low
educational standards and on the whole low professional ideals.”13
In general, the teacher at the university was a scholar of law,
while the teacher at the night or part-time school was a
practitioner of law.
The American Bar Association (ABA), which itself had
expressed concern for “‘creat[ing] conditions which [would] tend to
strengthen the character and improve the efficiency of those
admitted to the practice of law,’”14 spoke to concerns like those of
Stone by addressing standards for legal education in the United
States. In 1921, the ABA’s Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar recommended, and the ABA then accepted,
that every candidate for bar admission should have graduated
from a law school that had the following standards: two years of
college as a prerequisite, three years for full-time law study or
longer for part-time law study, an adequate library available for
law students, and a large enough number of faculty members who
would devote their full attention to the law school.15 This action by
the ABA effectively recognized the scholar’s “claim to primacy in
teaching law” because the ABA was endorsing the university law
school, and the scholar was a key player within the university law
school.16 Additionally, the ABA recommended that, after
graduation from an appropriate law school, a candidate should
Harlan F. Stone, The Future of Legal Education, 10 A.B.A. J. 233, 233 (1924).
Id.
13 Id.
14 Conference on Legal Education, 7 A.B.A. J. 637, 637 (1921).
15 Id. at 637-38.
16 John Henry Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal
Realists: The Professionalization of the American Law Professor, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC.
311, 317 (1985).
11
12
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have to take “an examination by public authority” before joining
the bar.17
In light of this ongoing evolution of U.S. legal education from
law office study toward university law school study, this Article
explains how, from 1920 to 1960, the role, or persona, of the law
professor in the United States remained a situs of considerable
rhetorical controversy. On one hand, lawyers used rhetoric to
continue to promote a persona, that of a scholar, appropriate for
the law professor situated within the university, a context suitable
for the professionalization of law. On the other hand, different
lawyers like Judge Jerome Frank used rhetoric to critique, often
in a scathing manner, the scholar persona and put forth their own
persona, that of a practitioner, as a more appropriate model for
legal education. Beginning at 1920, where prior scholarship
concluded an examination of the development of the scholar
persona of the law professor as a new phenomenon in U.S. legal
education,18 the current Article takes 1960 as an ending point
because, during the 1960s, law schools finally entered a new era
by discursively thinking of themselves as graduate programs of
study.19
To develop the argument, the Article will draw upon
rhetorical theory and present persona theory and persona analysis
as a means of conducting this study. Next, the Article will
consider the then-established persona of the law professor as
scholar and in turn the alternative persona of the law professor as
practitioner. For this study, the term lawyers will refer to
practicing lawyers and judges as well as academic lawyers. Given
that, to this day, law paradoxically remains a program of
academic study within the university that purports to prepare
students for practical careers, the insights from the rhetorics
between 1920 and 1960 remain important to understanding
present-day legal education.

Conference on Legal Education, supra note 14, at 638.
See generally Pedrioli, supra note 4.
19 Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself, 54 VA. L.
REV. 637, 649 (1968).
17
18
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I. PERSONA THEORY AND PERSONA ANALYSIS20
This section of the Article addresses the theory and
methodology for the present study. More particularly, the section
looks to rhetorical theory for a discussion of persona theory and
persona analysis.
Persona theory helps to inform the discussion of a law
professor persona suitable for law as an academic field. This
theory addresses the roles, or personae, that communicators create
in discourse.21 At least four types of personae can be present in
discourse, including the first, second, third, and fourth personae.22
However, given the focus of this Article on the first persona of the
law professor, this section will concentrate on the first persona.
The second, third, and fourth personae, which deal with
audiences, will not receive attention here.
The first persona is “the constructed speaker/writer or ‘I’ of
discourse.”23 Such a persona is “‘the created personality put forth
in the act of communicating’”24 and allows the communicator to
identify with the audience.25 In literature, the first persona is the
speaker or character a writer creates in the course of crafting
writing like poetry or fiction.26 In a way, a first persona is a
rhetorical mask that the communicator chooses to wear as he or

20 An expanded version of this discussion of persona theory and persona analysis
appeared in Pedrioli, supra note 4, at 65-69. The author of that article has retained
copyright to the article.
21 Paaige K. Turner & Patricia Ryden, How George Bush Silenced Anita Hill: A
Derridian View of the Third Persona in Public Argument, 37 ARGUMENTATION &
ADVOC. 86, 88 (2000).
22 Id.; Edwin Black, The Second Persona, 56 Q. J. SPEECH 109, 112 (1970); Philip
Wander, The Third Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory, 35 CENT.
STATES SPEECH J. 197, 209 (1984); and Charles E. Morris, Pink Herring & the Fourth
Persona: J. Edgar Hoover’s Sex Crime Panic, 88 Q. J. SPEECH 228, 230 (2002).
23 Turner & Ryden, supra note 21, at 88.
24 Paul Newell Campbell, The Personae of Scientific Discourse, 61 Q. J. SPEECH
391, 394 (1975) (emphasis omitted) (quoting WALKER GIBSON, PERSONA: A STYLE
STUDY FOR READERS AND WRITERS xi (1969)).
25 Walter G. Kirkpatrick, Bolingbroke and the Opposition to Sir Robert Walpole:
The Role of a Fictitious Persona in Creating an Audience, 32 CENT. STATES SPEECH J.
12, 12 (1981).
26 Emory B. Elliott, Jr., Persona and Parody in Donne’s The Anniversaries, 58 Q. J.
SPEECH 48, 49 (1972); Campbell, supra note 24, at 391 (observing that “[t]he term is
used to mean the imaginary, the fictive being implied by and embedded in a literary or
dramatic work”).
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she performs rhetorically, and because the persona at issue is a
mask, the persona is not necessarily the communicator himself or
herself.27 For example, Martin Luther King, Jr., assumed in his
discourse against civil rights violations the persona of a prophet,
although despite his skillful performance King was not necessarily
an actual prophet.28
The existing corpus of research on first personae has focused
predominantly on the performance of personae communicators
select.29 Although some communicators might create their own
first personae,30 many communicators employ first personae
already in existence. In the case of King, the chosen persona was
that of a prophet.31 Because the scholarly interest has tended to be
what communicators do with the assumed personae, scholars
often have ignored much or all of the process of the creation of
rhetorical personae.
Along this line, scholars who have conducted persona
analyses32 of performance of first personae have not explored in
depth situations in which communicators create, or continue to
create, in their discourse first personae for future use.33 While in
certain cases the two concepts of construction and performance of
first personae can function together, distinguishing between two
major types of first personae is necessary. On one hand, a
27 Thomas O. Sloan, The Persona As Rhetor: An Interpretation of Donne’s Satyre
III, 51 Q. J. SPEECH 14, 14, 26 (1965) (noting that, for example, one should “not confuse
the persona with [the poet]”).
28 Campbell, supra note 24, at 394.
29 See, e.g., B. L. Ware & Wil A. Linkugel, The Rhetorical Persona: Marcus Garvey
As Black Moses, 49 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 50, 56-61 (1982); Campbell, supra note 24, at
394; John L. Pauley, Reshaping Public Persona and the Prophetic Ethos: Louis
Farrakhan at the Million Man March, 62 W. J. COMM. 512, 522-23 (1998); Phyllis M.
Japp, Esther or Isaiah?: The Abolitionist-Feminist Rhetoric of Angelina Grimké, 71 Q.
J. SPEECH 335, 337, 339-43 (1985); Craig R. Smith, The Persona of Jesus in the Gospel
According to St. Matthew, 14 J. COMM. & RELIGION 57, 59-63 (1991); Laura Severin,
Becoming and Unbecoming: Stevie Smith As Performer, 18 TEXT & PERFORMANCE Q.
22, 32 (1998); Karrin Vasby Anderson, Hillary Rodham Clinton As ‘Madonna’: The Role
of Metaphor and Oxymoron in Image Restoration, 25 WOMEN’S STUD. COMM. 1, 19
(2002); and Nneka Ifeoma Ofulue, President Clinton and the White House Prayer
Breakfast, 25 J. COMM. & RELIGION 49, 55-61 (2002). But see Pedrioli, supra note 4, at
79-80.
30 Kirkpatrick, supra note 25, at 22.
31 Ware & Linkugel, supra note 29, at 61; Campbell, supra note 24, at 394.
32 Smith, supra note 29, at 64; Turner & Ryden, supra note 21, at 90.
33 But see Pedrioli, supra note 4, at 79-80.
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communicator can select and assume a persona in his or her
communication. The focus of study in this situation is on the
performance, so it is appropriate to think of this type of first
persona as a first persona performed (FPP). On the other hand,
the communicator might create the persona, which the
communicator or a different communicator might employ in
subsequent discourse. The idea is the creation of a discursive tool
for later implementation. This additional type of first persona is a
first persona constructed (FPC). The theoretical distinction allows
critics to focus more on either the performance or the construction
of first personae.
The present FPC study involves identification of the various
traits of the law professor for which, between 1920 and 1960,
lawyers argued in their writings and organization of such traits
into categories of personae. For instance, such traits include
participating in full-time teaching and research, as well as having
extensive practical experience in lawyering. These traits may be
more scholarly or more pragmatic in nature. When considered
together, the particular characteristics within artifacts offer an
outline of the law professor persona that communicators put forth.
The texts for this current research come from a search of
HeinOnline. This electronic database contains law review articles
that date back to the nineteenth century. For example, the
database contains the first issue of the American Law Register,
which debuted in 1852 and later became the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review.34 Although HeinOnline does not
necessarily contain all law reviews, the database does contain
hundreds of law reviews, including law reviews at some of the
most influential law schools. A critical advantage of the database
is that, unlike databases such as Westlaw and LexisNexis,
HeinOnline contains numerous articles that date back to the early
and mid twentieth century, which is essential for a study focused
on the era from 1920 to 1960. Hence, because it dates back so far,
HeinOnline proved to be an appropriate database for this
particular study.
The search in HeinOnline identified any law review article
that contained the terms law and professor in the title. Many such

34

1 AM. L. REG. (1852); STEVENS, supra note 1, at 128 n.34.
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articles, although not all, would be likely to address the subject of
this current study, but these articles would not necessarily
provide a comprehensive listing of relevant articles since the
discourse may have appeared in articles that did not focus
exclusively on the law professor. To increase the number of
appropriate articles identified, the search included locating
relevant articles cited in the footnotes of the articles that resulted
from the HeinOnline search. Accordingly, while the texts located
for this study are by no means all of those relevant to the topic,
they are both broad in their historical origins and not necessarily
limited to articles that focused exclusively on the law professor.

II. THE LAW PROFESSOR PERSONA – SCHOLAR V. PRACTITIONER
Applying persona theory to the texts identified for the study,
this section of the Article examines the two main personae that
lawyers put forth in their rhetoric between 1920 and 1960. The
discussion focuses on the persona of the law professor as scholar
and the persona of the law professor as practitioner.35

A. The Law Professor As Scholar
The law professor as scholar model, which Christopher
Columbus Langdell and James Barr Ames of Harvard Law School,
along with other like-minded lawyers, had promoted to the legal
field between 1870 and 1920,36 retained crucial importance
between 1920 and 1960. During this latter period, various lawyers
argued in favor of the merits of this scholar persona, including
how the persona was quite different from that of the judge or
practicing attorney, but controversy still remained. In general, the
scholar persona had major dimensions that included (1) an almost
exclusive professional commitment, (2) teaching duties, (3) the
production of research, and (4) a public function. As in the period
from 1870 to 1920, this scholar version of the law professor

35 Other than a few items like Jerome Frank’s brief comment that the law
professor might continue to practice law while teaching, this particular study did not
locate rhetoric that suggested scholar/practitioner hybrid models of the law professor.
See Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 921
(1933) [hereinafter Frank, Why Not].
36 See Pedrioli, supra note 4, at 69-75.
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persona was multidimensional, which is one possibility for a first
persona.37
First, pro-scholar lawyers argued that the law professor
should devote almost all professional time to the university. For
instance, Learned Hand of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit made such an argument,38 as did Chief Justice
William Howard Taft of the U.S. Supreme Court39 and Karl N.
Llewellyn of Columbia University Law School.40 Taft justified the
position that he, Hand, Llewellyn, and others took by claiming
that full-time work in the practice of law while one held
employment in a law school would prove to be a large distraction
from one’s scholarly duties.41 Carl C. Wheaton of the St. Louis
University Law School argued from the position of having been an
associate dean at a practitioner-taught law school that active
practitioners had “almost no time to prepare lectures” for class.42
Because time was so short for the legal practitioner, the law
professor had to be available full-time for teaching law students
and assuming other duties. Accordingly, the law professor persona
should be that of a full-time individual.
Second, advocates of the scholar persona argued that the law
professor persona should have a teaching dimension. Roscoe
Pound of the University of California, Los Angeles, Law School
stated, “If one’s main interest is in anything but his teaching he
will be no teacher.”43 According to Pound, some of the ideal
qualities in teachers were “a sense of their high calling as lawyers
and as teachers of law, devotion to duty, and putting forth of their
powers to the utmost in the work of the law school and the service
of the students.”44 By comparison, Hand suggested that members
of the bench and bar were “not competent as teachers,” so the
Smith, supra note 29, at 63.
Learned Hand, Have the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute to the Teaching
of Law?, 24 MICH. L. REV. 466, 466 (1926).
39 William Howard Taft, Legal Education and the University Law School, 10 MINN.
L. REV. 554, 555 (1926).
40 K. N. Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 651, 658 (1935).
41 Taft, supra note 39, at 556.
42 Carl C. Wheaton, Law Teaching and Pragmatism, 25 GEO. L. J. 338, 344 (1937).
43 Roscoe Pound, Some Comments on Law Teachers and Law Teaching, 3 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 519, 532 (1951).
44 Id. at 530.
37
38
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teaching function of the law professor was special.45 This approach
clearly assigned teaching to the persona of the law professor
rather than to the personae of other members of the legal field,
and, in doing so, the approach omitted many of the practical
aspects of law that experienced judges and practicing lawyers
might bring to the classroom.
Third, pro-scholar advocates claimed that, because teaching
was not enough, the law professor persona should have a research
dimension. Noting, in 1926, that “reports during the last quarter
century are proof enough of . . . an increasing tendency to accept
as authoritative the conclusions of the great writers” on the law,
Hand described the research dimension of the law professor
persona as having “preeminence.”46 William Prosser, dean at the
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, recalled many
applicants for law professorships who had never written much, if
anything, scholarly in nature.47 Prosser noted that individuals
who were interested in teaching law but not interested in writing
about law had “the wrong approach” to entering the legal
academy, and Prosser, as well as probably most law school deans,
would not have been likely to hire such candidates.48
Several other points about this research-oriented dimension
of the law professor persona are of note. For example, Harold Gill
Reuschlein of Georgetown University Law School added that a
legal researcher should be well “grounded in the law and other
disciplines.”49 Also, good research involved a professor’s ability to
make important contributions to the academic legal literature;
such contributions would not necessarily involve quantity but
instead quality.50 Observing a relationship between the research
and teaching dimensions of the law professor persona, Pound
maintained that research would be a source of inspiration for
teaching.51 Research, then, would aid a professor’s work in the
classroom.

45
46
47
48
49
50
51

Hand, supra note 38, at 466.
Id. at 468.
William L. Prosser, Advice to the Lovelorn, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 511 (1951).
Id. at 511-12.
Harold Gill Reuschlein, Law Professor–Post-War, 30 MINN. L. REV. 68, 69 (1946).
Id. at 71-72; Pound, supra note 43, at 532.
Pound, supra note 43, at 532.
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James Willard Hurst of the University of Wisconsin Law
School offered an important justification for the need for research
to be a key dimension of the law professor persona. Writing in the
late 1950s, Hurst conceded that law schools were supposed to
develop law graduates who would be able to practice law, but he
also pointed out that the law school, by then well established
within the university system, had a duty to contribute to one of
the main functions of the university,52 which one might describe
as “the production of knowledge.”53 In light of this point, Hurst
called for renewed vigor in university law school research that
would contribute to the university’s aim of enhancing
humankind’s knowledge of the world, including the legal world.54
Fourth, pro-scholar advocates maintained that the law
professor persona should have a public function dimension. Hand
argued that the law professor would provide guidance to the bench
and bar for a clear statement of “a doctrine, with a complete
knowledge of its origin, its authority and its meaning.”55 Hand
even went so far as to state that because the law professor
assumed a persona that was “less prone” to align itself with “the
side of wealth,” the law professor might be better suited “to solve
new questions” of doctrine.56 Also in terms of the public function
dimension, a law professor had to help bring “about better
requirements for admission to the bar.”57 One might assume that
such improvements would aid both the legal field and the public.
For purposes of comparison, while the law professor persona
was that of “the scholar,” the persona of someone on the bench or
at the bar was that of “the man of affairs.”58 Members of the bench
and bar heard cases and practiced law, respectively, but they did
not assume the personae of scholars. Rather, members of the
bench and bar would handle the cases that might “stimulate an

52 James Willard Hurst, Research Responsibilities of University Law Schools, 10 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 147 (1957).
53 JAMES ANDERSON, COMMUNICATION THEORY: EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
146 (1996).
54 Hurst, supra note 52, at 161.
55 Hand, supra note 38, at 468.
56 Id. at 471.
57 Pound, supra note 43, at 519.
58 Hand, supra note 38, at 482.
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excessive fertility of invention” in the minds of legal scholars.59
Again, although different members of the legal field might work
toward a “common enterprise of keeping and advancing the law,”60
each individual had a different persona to assume.
During the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, this rhetoric of a
law professor persona with the dimensions of an almost exclusive
professional commitment, teaching duties, the production of
research, and a public function echoed the rhetoric of Langdell,
Ames, and their colleagues from the fifty-year period before 1920,
but one minor modification began to appear in the law professor
as scholar model after 1920. Some limited practical experience
became more acceptable in the background of the law professor
persona. For instance, Taft admitted that some practical
experience might be of value to the law professor persona.61
Prosser observed that for various courses law schools were looking
“for some practice before teaching, some experience of some kind
in the field.”62 As an estimate, Prosser indicated that three years
of practical experience would be “about right” for the future law
professor.63 Wheaton felt that in some cases fewer than five years
might be appropriate.64 Suggesting that only a poor law faculty
would have absolutely no professors with practical experience,
Reuschlein noted that some legal experience was beneficial.65
Indeed, the professor ought to “become familiar with at least the
ordinary problems that arise in practice.”66
If one were to think that the emerging acceptance of some
limited practical experience in the background of the law professor
persona was a major addition to the scholar model, consideration
of a response from Prosser would be appropriate. Prosser quite
sharply pointed out the following: “One thing on which all law
schools are in agreement is that too many years of practice
hardens the arteries, stunts the intellect, and ossifies the ideas, so
that few lawyers over the age of fifty are ever much of a success
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 472.
Id. at 480.
Taft, supra note 39, at 555.
Prosser, supra note 47, at 513.
Id.
Wheaton, supra note 42, at 345.
Reuschlein, supra note 49, at 72-73.
Wheaton, supra note 42, at 346.
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when they retire and enter teaching.”67 It seems that the
acceptance of a few years of practical legal experience proved to be
a small concession to the lawyers who had been advocating the
practitioner model of the law professor persona. Indeed, the
essence of the scholar model of the law professor persona
remained. Langdell, Ames, and their allies would have been
pleased with this continuing promotion of their model.

B. The Law Professor As Practitioner
Regardless of the above-noted general affirmation of the law
professor persona as essentially that of a scholar, sharp resistance
to that position remained. One of the strongest voices, although
not the only voice, against the law professor as scholar model
came from Jerome Frank, a federal appellate judge who took more
than one opportunity to speak his mind on this matter. Indeed, in
1947, Frank observed that he had been calling for a different type
of legal education, which included an alternative law professor
persona, for the past fifteen years.68
In attempting to advance this alternative persona, Frank and
his colleagues maintained (1) that the scholar model generally did
not address the needs of legal education adequately and (2) that
the practitioner model was much better suited for legal education.
The ensuing discussion examines the arguments for such a
practitioner persona.
To make his argument that the scholar persona was
inadequate for legal education, Frank placed legal education
within its historical context as he saw it. Going back to the days of
Langdell, whom Frank called “a brilliant neurotic,”69 Frank
claimed that “[d]ue to Langdell’s idiosyncracies, law school law
came to mean ‘library-law.’ ”70 Langdell’s teaching method “was the
expression of the strange character of a cloistered, retiring bookish
man.”71 Under the Langdellian paradigm of legal education, the
law professor would become one who “had little or no contacts
Prosser, supra note 47, at 513.
Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1303 (1947)
[hereinafter Frank, A Plea].
69 Id.
70 Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 908 (emphasis in original).
71 Id.
67
68
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with or a positive distaste for the rough-and-tumble activities of
the average lawyer’s life.”72 Indeed, this approach to teaching law
was akin to teaching future horticulturists through the use of cut
flowers or future physicians without the expertise of individuals
“who had seldom seen a patient or diagnosed the ailments of fleshand-blood human beings.”73 One also might compare the
Langdellian approach to teaching law with teaching “toe-dancing,
swimming, automobile-driving, hair-cutting, or cooking wild
ducks” by merely talking about them and having students read
about them.74 Thus, to Frank’s chagrin, practical experience was
not a major dimension of the law professor persona that legal
education favored.75
Frank and other lawyers who agreed with his position
further critiqued the scholar model. For instance, Frank suggested
that a law school that adopted the scholar model forced law
professors who had substantial practical experience to capitulate
“to an atmosphere in which the memories of practice became
shadowy and unreal.”76 In class, the professor with legal
experience had “to belittle his experience at the bar.”77 Irving M.
Mehler of the Colorado Bar and the New York Bar asked, “How
can a teacher deem himself competent to project in a live and
compelling way, if he himself has never been confronted with not
one or a few, but with many live legal problems?”78 To this, Arch
M. Cantrall of the West Virginia Bar added that often the
idealized scholarly professor of the day was “just fresh from the
doors of some law school,”79 and Albert K. Orschel of the Illinois
Bar suggested that producing scholarship did not necessarily help

72 Id. Ironically, even Langdell himself, despite a great interest in the academic
side of the legal field, had practiced law for some sixteen years, mostly by writing briefs
and pleadings. Frank, A Plea, supra note 68, at 1303. Still, while in practice, Langdell
had “led a secluded life, seeing little of clients.” Id.
73 Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 912, 915.
74 Frank, A Plea, supra note 68, at 1311.
75 Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 909.
76 Frank, A Plea, supra note 68, at 1304.
77 Id.
78 Irving M. Mehler, In Defense of Practitioners As Teachers, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 231,
234 (1956).
79 Arch M. Cantrall, Law Schools and the Layman: Is Legal Education Doing Its
Job?, 38 A.B.A. J. 907, 910 (1952).
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students learn the practice of law.80 Naturally, critics of the
scholar persona saw this situation as problematic because the
students would not benefit from the practical experience of a
professor.
Taking a different angle on legal education, Frank and his
colleagues offered a position in sharp contrast to the one that the
pro-scholar lawyers took. Rather than favoring “experience in
learning law,”81 Frank favored looking beyond “rules and
principles” of cases and toward two main tasks of the lawyer,
which included predicting future court decisions in particular
lawsuits and trying to persuade courts in given cases to render
decisions favorable to one’s clients.82 Mehler reminded the legal
field that “the primary purpose of a law school [was] to train
lawyers.”83 Upon leaving law school, lawyers had to be ready for
the experiences of the “first year or two of practice,” as Cantrall
noted.84 Indeed, if new lawyers learned law while beginning to
practice, clients would have to pay the price.85 This understanding
of law school and legal practice helped explain why, at some point,
the law student needed to observe what transpired in law offices
and in court.86
Accordingly, Frank and other lawyers promoted a different
version of the law professor persona, that of a practitioner. One
might call such a persona that of “a ‘live’ lawyer.”87 First and
foremost, Frank maintained, the law professor should assume a
persona endowed with practical experience, and by that he meant
“not less than five to ten years of varied experience in the actual
practice of law.”88 Mehler suggested that at least seven years of
practical experience might suffice.89 This practical experience
would come from litigating in the trial and appellate courts,
80 Albert K. Orschel, Is Legal Education Doing Its Job?: Brief of Amicus Curiae, 40
A.B.A. J. 121, 123-24 (1954).
81 C. C. Langdell, Teaching Law As a Science, 21 AM. L. REV. 123, 124 (1887).
82 Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 910-11.
83 Mehler, supra note 78, at 231.
84 Arch M. Cantrall, Practical Skills Can and Must Be Taught in Law Schools, 6 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 316, 319 (1954).
85 Id. at 321.
86 Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 911.
87 Mehler, supra note 78, at 232.
88 Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 914 (emphasis in original).
89 Mehler, supra note 78, at 231.
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working in the office, dealing with clients, and negotiating.90 Such
experience would be that of individuals “who ha[d] drafted
contracts, . . . tried and defended tort actions, . . . drafted wills and
trusts, . . . handled corporate matters, . . . foreclosed mortgages, . . .
quieted titles, . . . defended those accused of crime, . . . had
experience in trial and appellate practice, and . . . counseled
clients regarding ordinary and difficult legal problems.”91 Indeed,
the law professor might even continue to practice law while
teaching.92 Regardless, the law schools should make “[e]xtensive
use of practitioners in every law school course.”93
Such practical experience as a part of the law professor
persona would help the law professor enhance personal credibility,
or ethos, with law students and thus enhance the learning
experience of the students.94 Mehler argued that when a teacher is
lacking in “the practical touch,” students have less regard for the
professor and in turn lose interest in the professor’s subject.95
However, when “the practical touch” is present in the learning
environment, “the subject glows, the respect and admiration for
the instructor is heightened, and even a supposedly ‘dead’ subject
becomes very much alive.”96 Indeed, ethos can have a relationship
with persona.97 In this case, the practitioner persona of the law
professor would enhance the ethos of the individual who assumed
that persona, and the benefit would be a better learning
environment for the students.
Lawyers who accepted this position maintained that the law
professor who assumed the practitioner persona ought to teach
students the practical aspects of law. One such venue for this
teaching was the legal clinic.98 To illustrate the benefits of the
practitioner persona, Frank listed several insights that law
students would gain from clinical instruction. These insights

Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 914.
Mehler, supra note 78, at 232.
92 Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 921.
93 Cantrall, supra note 84, at 322.
94 Mehler, supra note 78, at 232.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Roger D. Cherry, Ethos Versus Persona: Self-Representation in Written
Discourse, 15 WRITTEN COMM. 384, 402 (1998).
98 Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 917.
90
91
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included learning about how juries decide cases, the uncertain
nature of facts, the nature of how witnesses impact parties’ legal
rights, influences on judicial decision-making, negotiations and
settlements, and drafting client documents.99 While learning
appellate law was an aspect of learning law, it was not the most
important aspect because “upper courts . . . are relatively
unimportant for most clients.”100 Frank pointed out that “the
overwhelming majority of lawsuits are never appealed, and, in
most of the small minority which are appealed, the appellate
courts accept the facts as ‘found’ by the trial court.”101 He added,
“In most suits, no disagreement arises about the rules, and the
disputes relate solely to the facts.”102 Besides, Frank argued,
“Intelligent men can learn [criticism of appellate cases] in about
six months.”103
Mehler extended Frank’s argument by explaining how law
students would learn from more realistic experiences in the
classroom as well as in the clinic. For instance, a professor who
had assumed a practitioner persona might bring to class a set of
articles of incorporation that the professor had drafted and with
which the professor was familiar.104 Other examples would be
documents for matters that related to “wills, contracts,
partnership, property, and many other courses.”105 Under this
approach, the student would be able to engage actual legal
drafting and benefit from a “touch of realism.”106 In the end, “the
student [would] have had a taste of real law.”107
In addition, Frank added that the law professor could draw
from other fields in order to enhance the education of future legal
practitioners. As a good legal realist, he proposed that the law
professor call upon the social sciences and other allied fields so as
to instruct law students in “the inter-actions of the conduct of

99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 918-19.
Frank, A Plea, supra note 68, at 1306.
Id.
Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1318.
Mehler, supra note 78, at 233.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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society and the work of the courts and lawyers.”108 Frank
explained that “the vaguest recollections of [one’s] pre-legal work”
provided for “an insufficient feeling of the inter-relation between
law and the phenomena of daily living, and an artificial attitude
towards ‘Law’ as something totally distinct and apart from the
facts.”109
Critics of the scholar persona of the law professor did concede
that their approach would allow some law professors to assume an
exclusively scholarly persona.110 Nonetheless, law schools should
not primarily focus on developing future law professors; the
schools ought to focus on developing future lawyers.111 As such,
“the ‘library-law’ teacher should cease to dominate the schools,”112
and the law schools should back away from “Langdell’s morbid
repudiation of actual legal practice.”113
While very much invested in the hands-on aspects of the
practitioner persona of the law professor, various lawyers who
supported this position were careful to clarify that their vision of
the law professor was not necessarily one that called for a purely
trade school approach to legal education. Rather, the law professor
would assume the practitioner persona in a context that would
blend “[k]nowledge of what courts and lawyers do” and “visual
demonstration of the possible values of a rich and well-rounded
culture in the practice of law.”114 Indeed, some scholarship was
appropriate in the law school, too.115 This was a view of “a realistic
lawyer-school.”116 However, although Frank and his colleagues
were willing to allow for a minor academic touch to their version
of the law professor persona, their focus was on the practical
aspects of the law professor persona. Based on the above rhetoric,
one can conclude that these lawyers wanted law students to
emerge from law school as practice-ready graduates.
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110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 921-22.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 914; Orschel, supra note 80, at 122.
Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 915.
Id.
Frank, A Plea, supra note 68, at 1313.
Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 923.
Mehler, supra note 78, at 231.
Frank, Why Not, supra note 35, at 923.
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During this period in history, few individuals heeded the call
for reform in legal education,117 which included significantly
altering the nature of the Harvard version of the law professor
persona. The few individuals who may have listened to Frank and
his allies refused to allow practicality to be at the center of legal
education or at the core of the law professor persona.118 This
phenomenon suggested that the understanding of the law
professor persona as that of a practitioner was out of touch with
the understanding of the law professor persona as that of a
scholar, the latter of which held a position of prominence in legal
education.119

CONCLUSION
As this Article has illustrated, in the sample of texts from the
conflict over the ongoing rhetorical construction of the first
persona of the law professor between 1920 and 1960, two
competing personae appeared. These were the law professor as
scholar persona and the law professor as practitioner persona.
Essentially, the scholar model, which was dominant,120 remained
largely unchanged from the period between 1870 and 1920, except
that advocates of this model made the minor concession that some
limited practice before a lawyer assumed a professorship may
have been acceptable for the law professor persona. Meanwhile,
the practitioner model, complete with its focus on helping to foster
practice-ready law graduates, remained much the same as it had
between 1870 and 1920, but some advocates of this model did
make the slight concession that law school could be more than just
training for legal practice. Nonetheless, Frank maintained, “Our
law schools must learn from our medical schools. Law students
should be given the opportunity to see legal operations.”121

Frank, A Plea, supra note 68, at 1303.
Id. at 1327.
119 Schlegel, supra note 16, at 317.
120 Id.
121 Frank, A Plea, supra note 68, at 1315. Frank asked, “What would we think of a
medical school in which students studied no more than what was to be found in printed
case-histories, and were deprived of all clinical experience until after they received
their M.D. degrees?” Id.
117
118
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Any small concessions aside, the dividing line between
advocates of the scholar model and advocates of the practitioner
model was clearly the background of the persona of the law
professor. From one perspective, the law professor should assume
a scholarly persona and fit comfortably within the university
setting, yet from another perspective, the law professor ought to
work to help develop students into legal practitioners. This
tension between the values of intellectualism and practicality,
present during the period from 1870 to 1920, remained during the
period from 1920 to 1960, but the law school was now firmly tied
to the university system.122
At a theoretical level, this discussion of how the persona of
the law professor in the United States remained a situs of
considerable rhetorical controversy from 1920 to 1960 has
provided an additional example of the benefits of addressing the
first persona from a slightly different angle. While most of the
prior communication research on the first persona focused on the
performance of a pre-existing persona like that of a prophet, the
current study has supported the limited amount of research that
has illustrated in detail how communicators can fill volumes in
the act of rhetorically constructing, or continuing to construct, a
persona. This distinction is one between the FPP and the FPC.
The theoretical distinction allows critics to focus more on either
the performance or the construction of first personae, although
performance and construction are not mutually exclusive.
In light of the strong scholarly impulse of the times, lawyers
like Frank were voices crying out in the wilderness of legal
education.123 For the most part, with law school situated in the
university, the pleas of Frank and others were ignored. Frank
explicitly lamented, “No one has ever paid much attention to [my]
views.”124 Indeed, he was aware that, in making his case for the
practitioner persona of the law professor, he was “thinking
wistfully that perhaps this time some of [his] audience [would] not

Hurst, supra note 52, at 147.
Isaiah 40:3 (King James Version, 1611 edition) (“The voyce of him that cryeth in
the wildernesse, Prepare yee the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a
highway for our God.”).
124 Frank, A Plea, supra note 68, at 1303.
122
123
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dissent.”125 Rather than dissent, the audience essentially failed to
listen to the message, and today the plea for a practitioner
persona of the law professor, grounded in serious legal experience
and capable of providing law students with a practical education,
continues to ring out.126

Id.
Carlo A. Pedrioli, Professor Kingsfield in Conflict: Rhetorical Constructions of the
U.S. Law Professor Persona(e), 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 701, 720-25 (2012).
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